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ABSTRACT 
Background This article aims to revisit the role of digital media in acquiring campaign-
specific information.
Analysis We use datasets from the Making Electoral Democracy Work project that include
campaign-specific questions to analyze six regions in three democracies (Canada, Spain, and
France).
Conclusion and implications Results demonstrate that voters have a moderate level of
campaign-specific knowledge and that traditional media are, at first glance, more useful to
acquire political information. Nevertheless, when in interaction with partisanship, traditional
media display a surprisingly greater selection bias effect and appear less useful to acquire in-
formation. We thus argue that digital media are in fact not more vulnerable to potential echo
chambers that would lead to a homogenous information environment.
Keywords  Traditional media; Digital media; Political information; Echo chambers
RÉSUMÉ
Contexte  Cet article cherche revoir le rôle numériques des medias dans l’acquisition
d’information de campagne.
Analyse  Nous utilisons les données du projet Making Electoral Democracy Work qui inclut
des question d’information politique spécifiques de campagnes électorales pour analyser six
regions dans trois démocraties (Canada, Espagne et France).
Conclusion et implications  Les résultats démontrent que les électeurs ont un niveau
modéré d’information politique de campagnes électorales et que les medias traditionnels
sont, à première vue, plus utiles pour en faire l’acquisition. Néanmoins, en interaction avec
les individus partisans, ces médias traditionnels sont l’objet d’un biais de sélection plus
important et apparaissent donc moins utiles. Nous soutenons donc que les médias
numériques ne sont pas plus vulnérable aux de chambre d’écho qui mènerait à un
environnement d’information homogène.
Mots clés  Médias traditionnels; Médias numériques; Information politique; Chambre
d’écho
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Introduction
Research has indicated that voters are risk averse and are loath to support unknown
candidates (Alvarez & Franklin, 1994), although political information appears to be a
precious commodity for citizens. Thus, there is an argument to be made for the im-
portance of political information about the parties and candidates during electoral
campaigns rather than general political information. While many scholars have studied
the latter, the former has mostly been analyzed accidentally when surveys included
items of political information related to speciﬁc parties and/or candidates. We believe
that this type of knowledge deserves further study. Additionally, it is important to as-
sess which type of media is the most useful to acquire this information.
To do so, this article attempts to answer two main questions: As we know that
voters are uninformed about general political systems (Carpini & Ketter, 1996; Page &
Shapiro, 1992; Williams & Carpini, 2011; Zaller, 1992), does the same conclusion apply
to the level of political information related to parties and candidates during electoral
campaigns? What type of media is/are most useful to get this speciﬁc information and
why? We thus seek to contribute to the literature on political information, but even
more importantly, to propose an (alternative) analysis of digital media’s impact on the
acquisition of information.
First, the article turns to the question of political information to see how politi-
cally knowledgeable citizens generally are. Regardless of the fact that this is a well-
documented topic (Bartels, 2005, 1996; Blais, Gidengil, Fournier, & Neville, 2009;
Keeter & Delli Carpini, 1996; Prior, 2007), it is necessary to compare general political
knowledge to speciﬁc campaign information. Second, the article addresses the litera-
ture on “traditional versus digital media” to investigate which type of media con-
tribute the most to the acquisition of campaign information and how they do so
(Dimitrova, Shehata, Strömbäck, & Nord, 2014; Graber, 2001; Norris, 2000). Third, it
focuses on explaining the mechanism that accounts for the results of the traditional
versus digital media ﬁght.
Integrating context in the study of political information
An important component of a healthy democracy is the level of political information
of the electorate. Markus Prior (2007) deﬁnes political information as “knowledge of
speciﬁc political facts and concepts as well as knowledge of recent noteworthy polit-
ical events” (p. 28). This encapsulates both the deﬁnition of political knowledge in
general and in regards to campaign information. Additionally, according to Scott
Keeter and Michael Delli Carpini (1996), there are three types of political knowledge:
the rules of the game, the substance of politics, and the people and players. However,
many scholars (Bartels, 2005; Blais et al., 2009; Gidengil & Bastedo, 2014; Lau, Patel,
Fahmy, & Kaufman, 2014; Luskin, Fishkin, & Jowell, 2002) believe citizens are poorly
informed, either by lack of motivation, accessibility to information, or by institutional
problems.
Furthermore, although we are interested in general political information our study
focuses on campaign-speciﬁc information, as studies show that electoral campaigns
can provide a great deal of information (Nadeau, Nevitte, Gidengil, & Blais, 2008). As
will be explained in greater length in the methodology, campaign-speciﬁc information
pertains to information solely available during an electoral campaign, such as party
pledges and party slogans. 
Political knowledge acquisition
TradiTional media 
Traditional media may be perceived as being in decline as a result of the emergence
of digital media technologies, but it seems that their overall positive effect on the elec-
torate’s level of political information still stands. Richard Fox and Jennifer Ramos (2012)
ﬁnd that the use of traditional media, such as television, radio, and newspapers, is cor-
related with a greater level of general political information. First, newspapers have the
potential of providing a good amount of political information (Druckman, 2005), es-
pecially among more educated citizens, since information is presented in a more so-
phisticated manner than it is through television. Second, the integration of television
in the intimacy of the home has great promise for political information. For one, the
political coverage can provide a wide range of information that is easier to understand
than print news (Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; Graber, 2001). Being a less cognitively
demanding media, television functions as a “knowledge leveller” (Neuman, 1976,
p. 122), even if it might create a “knowledge gap” (Prior, 2005). Furthermore, this
media exposes citizens to televised election coverage and it is argued that “infotain-
ment” television shows provide information to speciﬁc groups that would not nor-
mally be exposed to it (Baum, 2003; Moy, Xenos, & Hess, 2005). As for radio, it has
invited listeners, as of the 1990s, to participate in many radio shows that could increase
the level of political information (Tolchin, 1996). However, Sidney Kraus and Dennis
Davis (1976) have found that radio news may not be an effective source of political in-
formation since the emergence of television. 
digiTal media
Although Pippa Norris (2000) ﬁnds a positive relationship between traditional media
and political information in Europe and the United States, she also ﬁnds this type of
relationship with internet consumption. Other authors have found similar results in
European contexts (Dimitrova et al., 2014; Hendriks, Hageman, & van Snippenburg,
2004). However, there are two diverging points of view on the potential of digital media
as democratic sources of political information. Cyber optimists believe the internet
has a positive effect on information as it offers many opportunities for political partic-
ipation and political engagement (Quintelier & Vissers, 2008), provides access to in-
formation (Bimber, 2003), reduces participation costs, and offers an interactive space
for citizens and political leaders alike (Dimitrova et al., 2014). Indeed, digital media
can be seen as an umbrella term that encompasses the Web 2.0 and its social media
platforms, such as Twitter, which have the potential of providing a public sphere for
political debate. Political blogs have also been of great interest to researchers of late, as
they can provide information about a campaign and provide an accessible platform
for politically involved citizens (Giasson, Raynauld, & Darisse, 2011). Furthermore,
many political parties, namely at the federal level in Canada, have incorporated social
media into their communication strategy (Cross, Mallow, Small, & Stephenson, 2015).
Hence, it is argued that digital media will have positive and potentially strong effects
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on political participation and knowledge (Jarvis, 2010; Norris, 2001). Indeed, it provides
an easier access to multiple news sources digitally (Dimitrova et al., 2014) and a digital
public sphere (Dalhgren, 2005).
On the other hand, while acknowledging the potential beneﬁts of digital media,
cyber pessimists have a more prudent point of view. They are somewhat sceptical
about digital media technologies, believing that traditional media are central and that
digital media are (at best) only complementary. They also believe conversations may
not be more informed and pertinent, as they may be similar to real-life discussions
(Chadwick, 2006). Additionally, Zoe Oxley (2012) has found that greater access to and
diversity of sources does not necessarily mean a more informed electorate, whereas
Prior (2005) advances that the efﬁciency of the effects of media depends on the per-
sonal preferences (which act as moderating variables) of citizens in regard to news
and entertainment television shows. Additionally, researchers such as Alex Marland,
Thierry Giasson, and Tamara Small (2014) have also studied the degree to which po-
litical elites use digital opinion research to curate their communication strategy. 
The importance of political information and the trap 
of building up an echo chamber
Regardless of the prevalence of politics in most societies, there is considerable literature
on the fact that the electorate is politically uninformed. According to Larry Bartels
(1996), lack of information can lead to decisions that are contradictory with one’s val-
ues, interests, and opinions. Political information is very precious to citizens, but there
are considerable gaps in the level of political knowledge of the citizenry, which may
be explained by many factors, such as motivation, partisanship, and media consump-
tion to name but a few. With a greater access to information provided by digital media,
these motivated electors may browse a vast array of news and political content.
However, they may also curate the content they are exposed to according to their party
identiﬁcation (Keeter & Delli Carpini, 2003). Citizens thus have the possibility of rein-
forcing previous biases by seeking news sources that support pre-existing attitudes
(Nie, Miller, Golde, Butler, & Winneg, 2010), political beliefs (Garrett, 2009), and pref-
erences (Prior, 2005). This shows a fragmentation of citizens into politically like-
minded groups (Sunstein, 2001). This can be a result of selective exposure (Feldman
& Price, 2008; Mutz, 2006) and can create echo chambers, in which like-minded users
share similar views and opinions, which can in turn limit the acquisition of political
information. According to Leon Festinger (1957), citizens who wish to curate their in-
formational environment can be explained by the theory of cognitive dissonance.
Following this theory, the electorate may enjoy consuming information that conﬁrms
their decision. Furthermore, these echo chambers, where preconceived opinions and
partisan beliefs are reinforced, can also generate a homophilic user base. In this sense,
a homophilic user base is generally limited in its attitudes, information, and interac-
tions (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001).
Hypotheses
As we are unable to know the extent to which citizens are knowledgeable about cam-
paign-speciﬁc information, we focus on traditional and digital media. Going against
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conventional wisdom that traditional media are in decline and offer a broader spec-
trum of political information in comparison to digital media (Dizard, 1997; Webster &
Phalen, 1997), we argue that traditional media are more useful to learn this kind of in-
formation. The rationale is that digital media is more prone to a self-selection bias than
traditional media. Hence, our hypotheses go as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Traditional media are more useful than digital media to ac-
quire political information concerning the campaign. Furthermore, the lit-
erature reviewed leads us to believe that self-selection bias could affect
one’s informational environment and one’s level of political knowledge. 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the self-selection bias, the less useful a media
will be in acquiring political information. 
Method and indicators
We use datasets from the Making Electoral Democracy Work project (Blais, 2010). This
international collaboration studies elections in ﬁve different countries. We excluded
Switzerland and Germany because indicators used were not the same in these coun-
tries and thus do not enable comparison. This left us with Canada, France, and Spain
for a total of six elections in two different regions for each country. In Canada, we stud-
ied two regional elections, namely the Ontario (2011) and Québec (2012) elections.
Provence-à-Côte-d’Azur and Ile-de-France are the regions analyzed in France during
the legislative election of 2012, and ﬁnally, the regions of Madrid and Catalonia in Spain
during the national election in 2012.
The selected cases offer a range of several elections functioning under different rules dur-
ing electoral campaigns. Most importantly, the selected cases present different media systems.
Following Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini (2004), France and Spain are in a “Mediterranean”
or “Polarized Pluralist” media system and Canada is a “Liberal” model. The major features
differentiating these systems are the level of political parallelism and reporters’ professional-
ization. In France and Spain, the level of political parallelism—the link between political
actors and the media—is quite important, while it is very low in a Liberal system. Furthermore,
the reporters are less professionalized in the Polarized Pluralist model and, consequently with
the political parallelism, instrumentalization for political purposes is not rare. On the contrary,
there is a strong professionalization and non-institutionalized self-regulation in the Liberal
model. Moreover, there are some interesting regional differences in Spain and Canada, as
they both have a region with a strong attachment to regional identity. Hence, regional elec-
tions in Catalonia and Québec are considered more important than other regional elections.
Another methodological feature concerns the period studied. It is limited to 2011
and 2012. Since then social media has become more prominent in electoral campaigns,
as the user base has grown. For example, Twitter had 100 million users in 2011 whereas
there were more than 320 million users in 2016. Furthermore, political parties have
also adopted other types of social media platforms, such as Instagram and Snapchat,
which was not the case during the period studied. Hence, further research should be
conducted in order to test if our results stand several years later.
The survey design is always the same. Surveys were quota-based internet ques-
tionnaires that ensure the diversity of the sample in terms of socioeconomic back-
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ground. A ﬁrst wave was conducted during the two weeks preceding election day, and
a second wave was conducted a week later. The pre-electoral wave reached about 1,000
respondents while the post-electoral wave reached around 750 voters, for an average
75 percent follow-up response rate. To correct the attrition rate between the two waves,
and other potential biases, we weight our sample according to age, gender, education,
region, mother tongue, and turnout.
Operationalization
Our main variables are campaign-speciﬁc information and media consumption re-
garding the campaign.1 Campaign information is measured by speciﬁc pledges that
parties made during the campaign, as well as the party slogan. For every election, re-
spondents were asked to associate three promises to the correct party. Each pledge
and slogan is coded 1 if the respondent associates it correctly with the party and 0 if
not. Respondents were asked to associate three pledges to the correct party, as well as
three slogans. This measure is rescaled in a continuous way from 0 to 1. For the media
consumption regarding the campaign, the questions are straightforward and they di-
rectly ask in the post-electoral wave: “Using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means ‘no
attention at all’ and 10 ‘a lot of attention,’ how much attention did you pay to news
about the election [on television/in the newspaper/on the radio/on the internet/on
Twitter].” These measures are also rescaled from 0 to 1.
In regards to digital media, the frontier between each type of media is blurred.
However, we believe that the only problematic confusion is between internet and
newspapers. For example, if a respondent listens to the radio online, we consider this
to be a traditional media. The same rational applies to a respondent who watches a
television show online. Hence, there is only one very speciﬁc unclear situation, which
is between internet and newspapers, as some may wonder what to think of a respon-
dent who reads the Globe & Mail or La Presse online, rather than the traditional
printed format. We believe this is not too problematic for three reasons. First, it con-
cerns only one situation between two media. Second, even in this case, it does not
concern all individuals who use both types of media. Some will read the printed news-
paper, but also read articles online and the distinction will not be blurred. Third, the
descriptive statistics on the media consumption does not appear as exaggerating ei-
ther one media or the other.
Another concern about this indicator is related to respondents’ capacity to recall
sources of information and their possible overestimation due to social desirability. We
believe it is not impossible, without being overwhelming. Furthermore, when one
looks at the media consumption distribution, the scores are not that high. This is prob-
ably due to the fact that the question speciﬁes that it is about media consumption for
political purposes. The distribution of media consumption allows us to be rather con-
ﬁdent that this potential problem does not affect the results.
For the vote choice, we took the reported vote from the respondents. Finally, we
included several controls such as age, gender, education (coded 1 if the respondent
did some postsecondary education or more and 0 if not), and general political infor-
mation, which is measured by associating the promises and slogans with the correct
political party (the same way that people associated slogans and pledges).2
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Results
We ﬁrst assess if voters are as uninformed in terms of campaign-speciﬁc information
as they are in terms of general politics as reviewed in the literature. Figure 1 suggests
that voters are more knowledgeable about general information than campaign-speciﬁc
facts. Voters can recognize leaders with much more accuracy than party pledges and
slogans. The overall mean of campaign-speciﬁc information is 0.44, compared to 0.76
for general political information. In other words, citizens managed to access informa-
tion about the campaign and correctly match about 45 percent of the slogans and
promises asked. While scholars already know that citizens pay much more attention
to politics during elections, these prove to be mixed. Since about 45 percent of the sur-
vey respondents answered our campaign-speciﬁc items correctly, the interpretation
of this result is a question of seeing the glass half empty or half full. Our interpretation
is that despite the fact that these results are not the best way to depict citizen’s political
competences, it displays a more nuanced picture of the conventional wisdom, which
depicts a politically uninformed citizen. What is much clearer is that citizens are doing
much better when it comes to general political information. 
Figure 1: Campaign-specific information versus general political information
Campaign-spectific information                          General political information 
Note: Bars display mean of campaign’s political information. N = 3376
For example, Keeter and Delli Carpini (1996) often refer to the fact that only 30
percent of American citizens—which represents the ignorant median voter—can
name either senators of their state. Furthermore, the level of basic knowledge of gov-
ernmental institutions and how they work is very low, as exempliﬁed by the fact that
very few can identify the party in control of Congress (Neuman, 1986). We argue that
questions tapping general political information are much easier than asking respon-
dents to associate slogans and pledges to the correct party, thus reinforcing our gener-
ous interpretation of these results.
We now analyze the impact of ﬁve different types of media: newspaper, television,
radio, internet, and Twitter. Media consumption for these different media is shown in
Table 1. Three main patterns emerge concerning their relative consumption: ﬁrst, tel-
evision is always the most consumed media, second, there is almost no difference be-
tween the consumption of newspaper, radio, and internet, and third, Twitter is by far
the least popular media used by citizens during electoral campaigns. It is worth noting
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some regional differences. However, the three patterns noted above stand in each re-
gion. As expected, regions characterized by a strong identity consume more political
media content. For example, respondents from Québec score higher for every media.
More speciﬁcally regarding digital media, Québec citizens have a mean of 0.40 versus
0.29 for Ontarians. Furthermore, Twitter has a mean of 0.09 for Québeckers and .05
for Ontarians. 
Table 1: Media consumption
Note: mean of media consumption; standard errors in parentheses.
As the surveys were conducted online, it is probable that political internet con-
sumption will be overestimated. However, we believe this should not be a problem as
the data realistically shows that the internet is not a clear outlier of the distribution.
In fact, it is simply not the case as its consumption is close to that of other media. We
now turn to the analysis of media effects in the learning process. To do so, we regress
these media types, including control variables to isolate their independent effect on
campaign’s political information. Results are displayed in Table 2.
Table 2: Different media, different impact on political information
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Newspaper Television Radio Internet Twitter
Media 
consumption 
.39
(.34)
.60
(.31)
.33
(.33)
.39
(.35)
.10
(.22)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Age
0.001***
(0.00)
0.001***
(0.00)
0.001***
(0.00)
0.001***
(0.00)
0.002***
(0.00)
0.002***
(0.00)
0.001***
(0.00)
Female
-0.061***
(0.01)
-0.060***
(0.01)
-0.061***
(0.01)
-0.061***
(0.01)
-0.061***
(0.01)
-0.059***
(0.01)
-0.056***
(0.01)
Education
0.039***
(0.01)
0.032***
(0.01)
0.030***
(0.01)
0.036***
(0.01)
0.034***
(0.01)
0.036***
(0.01)
0.021**
(0.01)
Interest
0.016***
(0.00)
0.012***
(0.00)
0.015***
(0.00)
0.015***
(0.00)
0.014***
(0.00)
0.015***
(0.00)
0.012***
(0.00)
Partisanship
0.020*
(0.01)
0.018*
(0.01)
0.022**
(0.01)
0.021**
(0.01)
0.020*
(0.01)
0.022**
(0.01)
0.019*
(0.01)
General 
political 
information
0.305***
(0.02)
0.298***
(0.02)
0.292***
(0.02)
0.307***
(0.02)
0.299***
(0.02)
0.309***
(0.02)
0.292***
(0.02)
Newspaper
0.083***
(0.02)
0.065***
(0.02)
TV
0.039**
(0.02)
0.014
(0.02)
Radio
0.030*
(0.02)
-0.013
(0.02)
Table 2: (continued)
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; standard errors in parentheses. A fixed effect for every election is in-
cluded (not shown) in the regression.
First, there is nothing new here concerning the socio-demographic variables:
young voters as well as women are less knowledgeable (Keeter & Delli Carpini, 1996),
while more educated citizens possess more campaign-speciﬁc information.
Furthermore, partisanship matters in the sense that people who feel close to a party
are more knowledgeable than non-partisans. Media consumption variables are dis-
played in bold. Overall, newspapers and internet have the greatest (signiﬁcant) impact
on the acquisition of campaign-speciﬁc information. Every type of media in models
2–6 express a positive relation (as expected), meaning that a greater consumption of
a media, irrespective of if it is a traditional or a new one, increases signiﬁcantly. To a
lesser extent, television and radio, both traditional media, also have a positive impact.
We can thus conclude that both traditional and digital media are useful to learn polit-
ical information related to a campaign.
When combined in the last model, some changes appear: radio and television
lose their signiﬁcance while Twitter becomes negative. The rationale for the changes
observed for Twitter and internet is intriguing. Our intuition was that a negative rela-
tionship might be explained by a self-selection exposure. Taking into account that
Twitter is an ideal platform for partisans to build a selective network and thus be ex-
posed to homogeneous information, we believe that most Twitter users build their
own digital echo chambers, which could explain our results.
To test this rationale, which was formalized by our second hypothesis, we tested
two different models in Table 2. Models 1 and 2 include the very same variables, but
the former focuses on non-partisans while the later focuses exclusively on partisans.
The results produced are quite surprising. The media’s coefﬁcients on non-partisans
are positive as expected, with the exception of radio, which can be explained by
Susan Tolchin (1976). Also noteworthy is the fact that only newspapers are a signiﬁ-
cant predictor of the political knowledge. It is surprising that television does not
have the expected signiﬁcant positive impact (Baum, 2003; Chafee, Zhao, & Leshner,
1994) and that Twitter, often considered a breeding ground for echo chambers, dis-
plays a positive coefﬁcient. This gives us a hint that non-partisans might not be build-
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Internet
0.058***
(0.02)
0.040**
(0.02)
Twitter
0.014
(0.02)
-0.026
(0.02)
Constant
-0.131***
(0.03)
-0.121***
(0.03)
-0.128***
(0.03)
-0.134***
(0.03)
-0.141***
(0.03)
-0.138***
(0.03)
-0.135***
(0.03)
R2 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
N 3471 3454 3356 3451 3454 3387 3272
ing an echo chamber, but we will need to compare them with partisans, which the
second model does.
The second model also provides a great deal of surprises. With the exception of the
internet, the consumption of every type of media becomes lessuseful to acquire political
information comparatively to Model 1. Newspapers are still positive and signiﬁcant, al-
though the magnitude of the effect is less important. Television and radio display nega-
tive coefﬁcients (i.e., for a partisan, the more she consumes television, the less she
acquires political knowledge related to the campaign). More importantly for our echo
chamber rationale is the result for Twitter. While we can postulate that non-partisans
are less subject to the construction of an echo chamber on this media, our results conﬁrm
that the reverse is also true: partisans build their homogeneous network and reinforce
their knowledge without exiting their isolated inner circle. Model 1 displays a positive
coefﬁcient for non-partisans, while partisans using Twitter are more subject to a negative
impact. It is thus useful to differentiate this speciﬁc media versus internet in general. We
ﬁnd support for our second hypotheses that highlights the build up of an echo chamber
as the mechanism that partially ex-
plains media’s impact on political in-
formation.
This leads us to believe that par-
tisanship not only hinders one’s abil-
ity to learn new campaign-speciﬁc
information but it also affects tradi-
tional media, which are generally be-
lieved to be a source of varied and
rather objective information. At least,
they should be more so than digital
media.
Having a different measure to
separate Twitter from the rest of inter-
net is very useful as we can test
whether this platform, with the most
potential of a self-selection bias, has
a negative impact once it interacts
with partisanship. As expected, parti-
sans on Twitter learn less information
than non-partisans. In sum, we can
say that, ceteris paribus, traditional
media are more useful to acquire in-
formation as predicted by our ﬁrst hy-
potheses, but not because they
are—contrary to our second hypothe-
ses—less susceptible of creating an
echo chamber. We ﬁnd evidence of a
self-selective mechanism concerning
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Model 1 Model 2
On non-partisan On partisan
Age
0.001***
(0.00)
0.001***
(0.00)
Female
-0.047***
(0.01)
-0.069***
(0.01)
Education
0.028*
(0.01)
0.014
(0.02)
Interest
0.011***
(0.00)
0.015***
(0.00)
General political
information
0.308***
(0.03)
0.241***
(0.04)
Newspaper
0.076***
(0.03)
0.049*
(0.03)
TV
0.040
(0.02)
-0.026
(0.03)
Radio
-0.013
(0.02)
-0.018
(0.02)
Internet
0.016
(0.02)
0.071***
(0.02)
Twitter
0.030
(0.03)
-0.088***
(0.03)
Constant
-0.153***
(0.04)
0.224***
(0.05)
R2 0.33 0.35
N 1786 1486
Table 3: Media consumption and political
information on partisans and non-partisans
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; standard errors in
parentheses. A fixed effect for every election is included
(not shown) in the regression.
a particular social media platform (Twitter), but as a whole, internet appears to be less
affected by this mechanism that reduces political learning. The predicted probabilities
shown in Table 3 sum up the rationale. 
Conclusion
This research ﬁlls two gaps in the literature. We ﬁrst aimed to answer the general ques-
tion “Do people know more about electoral campaigns than they do about general
politics?”. Our results suggest that, in general, citizens are not more informed about
electoral campaigns than they are about politics. However, our results also suggest
that the political knowledge landscape may not be as bleak as is shown in the literature.
For example, respondents were able to correctly associate about 45 percent of cam-
paign-speciﬁc information items. We also examined different types of media and their
impact on campaign-speciﬁc information acquisition and found that traditional media
can in fact prove to be more useful to acquire information, with newspapers having
the largest impact. These results support our ﬁrst hypothesis. However, upon examin-
ing media effects on partisan versus non-partisan respondents, differences generated
by the creation of an echo chamber appear. In this sense, Twitter can be vulnerable to
a self-selection bias in the consumption of information and hence be less helpful for
partisans, even though the internet in general persists to have a positive (and signiﬁ-
cant) impact, even on partisans. In fact, this impact is larger for partisans than non-
partisans. Surprisingly, traditional media are less useful when we focus on partisans
and hints that they are not less vulnerable to a self-selection information environment
that would affect the level of political information. Additionally, results hold under ro-
bustness controls and apply in six regions within three democracies. 
Notes
For more information about the datasets and the exact question wording, see Making Electoral1.
Democracy Work (n.d.). 
Contrary to campaign-speciﬁc items, the identity of leaders is known in the years leading to the2.
election and thus can be used as a good proxy for a general political information indicator.
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